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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 24, 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: CIA Occupancy of the New Building in McLean, Virginia

For your information there is enclosed a recommendation on the subject as excerpted from the report made to the President on July 18, 1961 by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Before the recommendation is presented to the President for final action, it would be appreciated if you would submit your views and comments thereon.

It is requested that your views and comments be provided to this office and to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board by August 21, 1961.

McGeorge Bundy

Enclosure

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cc: The President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board

(Attention: Mr. J. Patrick Coyne)

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Att to DD/S-61-2502

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## THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

"The Board recommends that action should be taken at the earliest possible date to assure that the Central Intelligence Agency's plans for the occupancy of the new building in McLean, Virginia are feasible. (We believe there are valid questions that may be raised about these plans. In particular, there are questions about moving all of the clandestine activities into the building. We recommend accordingly that these plans be reviewed administratively, and that a feasibility study be made as to the possibility of housing all of the clandestine functions, or some part thereof, in another place. We believe it may be appropriate to house in the new building some of the non-clandestine functions of the Central Intelligence Agency which are now scheduled to be relocated to other buildings in Washington.)"

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- 3. The difficulty of providing adequate secure areas for the storage of classified material due to the temporary construction of the majority of buildings presently housing Agency components.
- 4. The difficulty in assuring rapid response to various after-hours alarm systems on the part of security personnel to such a vast complex of buildings.
- 5. The security hazard involved in the collection and destruction of classified waste for the year 1961.
- 6. The inherent insecurity involved in the large number of maintenance and char force personnel required to service these buildings.
- III. The relocation of Agency activities in the new building at Langley will, for the first time, achieve physical, personnel and operational security for Agency operations which has not been possible under the current situation wherein we have had to operate out of thirty-six buildings or locations scattered over a ten-mile radius.

  Specifically, some of these advantages are:
  - 1. Central security-controlled area which gives maximum security to our activities;


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- 2. Secure internal communications system including telephones, pneumatic tubes, etc.;
- 3. Physical proximity of the support and clandestine service personnel allowing immediate and secure coordination;
- 4. Centralized and, therefore, more economical and accessible document filing systems;
- 5. The maintenance and use of classified documents within one secure building obviating exposure to loss, theft, etc.;

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- 6. The built-in arrangements for the destruction of approximately classified waste per year at considerable dollar savings;
- 7. The reduction in the guard force with a savings of \$277,967.00;
- 8. Reduction in numbers of expensive vaulted areas, secure briefing areas and top secret file storage facilities;
- 9. Improved physical security of the building perimeter and monitoring of visitors:
- 10. One centralized and coordinated alarm and response system which is more highly effective;
- 11. A single building housing several thousand people which can allow anonymity insofar as individual assignments and activities are concerned;



- 12. An ease and economy in the screening, processing and clearance of personnel.
- IV. A separation of the Clandestine Services from the DDI would present very serious Security considerations. As certain of the support elements are actually designed to be and are an integral part of the Clandestine Services, these elements must accompany the C/S if the C/S is to be housed in a separate building or buildings. This would result in:
  - 1. A separation of Agency activities requiring an almost complete duplication of security requirements.
  - 2. The creation of a communications security problem between Langley Headquarters and separate building or buildings located eight or more miles distant.
  - 3. Serious security hazards in the transmitting of classified material by couriers and individuals between the two compartments.
  - 4. An obvious pin-pointing of the different type of activity between the Clandestine Services and those occupying Headquarters at Langley.
  - 5. The housing of the Clandestine Services in buildings not designed or ill-suited for the secure conduct of their operations.

- 6. The establishment of two records centers creating expensive and time-consuming duplication of classified material which increases the security hazards.
- 7. The possibility of joint-use of other government buildings by the C/S which exposes identities, personnel and visitors to uncontrolled and undesirable observation.
- 8. The additional expense involved in the establishment of a separate system for the collection and destruction of classified material.
- 9. The duplication of the physical alarm systems, vaults, storage facilties, guards, receptionists and char force personnel in the building or buildings to be occupied by the Clandestine Services and their support components.
- V. A compartmentation of the C/S and the DDI would involve
  the housing of a considerable portion of the Agency in quarters located
  in the downtown Washington area. The exact figures for the number
  of people involved in such a compartmentation is not easily ascertainable; however, it would probably involve between
  personnel. This raises the question of the unused space in the Headquarters Building at Langley. The utilization of this space by other
  governmental agencies would practically obviate the entire concept.

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design and purpose of the new building which was specifically constructed with built-in security arrangements peculiar to the needs of this Agency.

If an attempt were made to have the new building jointly occupied by this Agency and and her government component, there would have to be serious and extensive alterations due to the following factors:

- 1. The building was conceived, designed and built under the conception of a single unit housing a single agency with peculiar security requirements.
- 2. The entire building and grounds has a built-in physical arrangement to meet the Agency needs and any modification will impair the security we are desiring to achieve.
- 3. Within the building, the internal communications system was built-in at considerable cost as a single secure system.

  The division of this system is practically impossible if security is to be maintained.
- 4. The physical control of visitors becomes an expensive and difficult task.
- 5. Agency personnel are exposed to uncontrolled observation plus the fact that the mingling of personnel in the insecure areas creates additional security hazards.

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6. There would be an expensive alteration of the building to achieve a compartmentation between the Agency activities and the activities of the other government component. This involves extra barriers, guards, receptionists, etc.

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